Mikael's Accountability Blog (Go to our Main Page:ImpeachForPeace.org)

A Dangerous Precedent

A statement by Amnesty International in March 2006 described the salient issue in the Abu Ali case:

Amnesty International remains seriously concerned that the trial of Ahmed Abu Ali was flawed as the jury was not allowed to hear evidence supporting his claim that he was tortured into confessing while he was held for one and a half years without charge or trial in Saudi Arabia. Amnesty International is seriously concerned that the case may have set a worrying precedent on the admissibility of torture evidence in US courts. Amnesty International urges that, if appealed, the courts will address this issue.

Now that the case has been appealed, and a decision rendered, we will see how the courts chose to “address this issue.” But first, let’s consider what occurred at the initial Abu Ali trial. Again, from Amnesty International:

Judge Gerald Bruce Lee ruled that only evidence that related directly to Ahmed Abu Ali’s interrogation would be admissible, thus denying the defence the opportunity to present relevant contextual evidence. Judge Lee had ruled during pre-trial proceedings that the US government had shown by a “preponderance of evidence” that the statements made by Ahmed Abu Ali in Saudi Arabia were “voluntary”, and that his incriminating statements were admissible at trial. During the trial, general statements from Saudi Arabian officials were used to undermine Ahmed Abu Ali’s allegations whilst his defence lawyers were not allowed to present any evidence pertaining to Saudi Arabia’s human rights record on torture…

Amnesty International is seriously concerned that the trial of Ahmed Abu Ali may have set a precedent in US courts of according unqualified support to the declarations of a foreign government regarding its human rights record as a means of rendering evidence admissible, including statements obtained by torture and ill-treatment.

What was the evidence that Ali’s lawyers sought to present? It included documentation of Saudi human rights violations and use of torture, and the psychiatric evaluations done on Mr. Abu Ali himself, which supported the contention that his mental and emotional state was consistent to someone who had been tortured as he alleged. According to an ACLU document, Abu Ali was held in solitary confinement. “During the first three days of interrogation, he was punched, kicked in the stomach, struck with a hard object more than ten times, whipped while he was chained to the floor, and threatened with amputation or beheading.” He did not see a U.S. embassy official for his first month of captivity. His “confession” came about three weeks later.
As for evidence of Saudi Arabian use of torture to obtain confessions, the court could have used documentation from the U.S. State Department Report on Saudi Arabia human rights practices released in March 2002, just one year prior to Abu Ali’s arrest.

Shar’ia (Islamic law) prohibits any judge from accepting a confession obtained under duress; however, there were credible reports that the authorities abused detainees, both citizens and foreigners. Ministry of Interior officials are responsible for most incidents of abuse of prisoners, including beatings, whippings, sleep deprivation, and at least three cases of drugging of foreign prisoners. In addition there were allegations of torture, including allegations of beatings with sticks, suspension from bars by handcuffs, and threats against family members. Torture and abuse are used to obtain required confessions from prisoners (see Section 1.e.). There were reports that in detention centers some boys and young men were flogged, forced constantly to lie on hard floors, deprived of sleep, and threatened with whipping and other abuse.

The government report also notes that Saudi Arabia “has refused to recognize the mandate of the U.N. Committee Against Torture to investigate alleged abuses”. Furthermore, the Saudis do not allow international observers to investigate complaints of torture. Interestingly, even in the Abu Ali case, FBI agents were not allowed to see or interview the prisoner while he was held in Saudi custody. (The FBI ultimately submitted a list of nine questions they wanted the Saudis to ask.)

Implausibility and Credibility Turned Upside Down

The unanimous decision by the Fourth Circuit to uphold the Abu Ali conviction (there was one dissent over the question of resentencing guidelines) rubber-stamps the decision by the trial court to suppress evidence that Abu Ali’s confession was elicited under torture. This is their reasoning (from Friday’s ruling – I quote extensively, as it is a remarkable document, with emphases in bold my own editorial emendation):

Initially, the court properly recognized that “torture, and evidence obtained thereby, have no place in the American system of justice.” Abu Ali, 395 F. Supp. 2d at 380. But, based on its evaluations of “the credibility of the witnesses,” and “the quality of the evidence presented,” id. at 374, the district court found itself “left with lingering questions concerning the credibility of Mr. Abu Ali and his claim that he was tortured,” id. at 378. The court credited the testimony of the Saudi Arresting Officer and the Lieutenant Colonel (the Warden at the Medina detention facility where Abu Ali was held for two days following his arrest) that no Saudi official used coercive interrogation techniques on Abu Ali. The court found that the Lieutenant Colonel’s testimony that Abu Ali was never abused was believable while Abu Ali’s contrary testimony “raise[d] questions that bear on the defendant’s credibility.” Id. at 373.

In addition, the court relied on the testimony of two other Saudi officials, the Brigadier General and the Captain, that the interrogation of Abu Ali in Riyadh “was conducted in the absence of threats or torture.” Id. at 373. The court found “implausible” Abu Ali’s “claim about having been whipped” during the early period of his detention because several Saudi and American witnesses who observed him during this period reported behavior “that do[es] not coincide with how a recently beaten person would behave.” Id. at 374. Moreover, the court found that “[s]ome aspects” of Abu Ali’s testimony “just do not flow logically,” id. at 378, and observed that “during his testimony, there were times where Mr. Abu Ali seemed to deflect the question,” id. Finally, the court considered, but found deficiencies in, the testimony of Abu Ali’s medical experts who supported his torture claim, crediting instead the testimony of the government’s experts that Abu Ali showed no physical or psychological signs of mistreatment.

The district court largely rested its legal conclusion that Abu Ali’s statements were voluntary on its factual findings concerning his claims of torture and abuse. Our thorough review of the record provides no basis for finding clear error in any of those findings. This, however, does not end our inquiry. We must evaluate the voluntariness of Abu Ali’s confessions de novo, looking to the totality of the circumstances to determine whether his will was “overborne.” See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225.

In making this evaluation, we consider that Abu Ali was not provided the legal protections – including prompt presentment and Miranda warnings – that the Constitution requires be provided to suspects by United States law enforcement officers. Saudi Arabia is a sovereign nation with its own legal system, and the failure to provide Abu Ali these protections does not, in and of itself, require exclusion of the statements Abu Ali made in Saudi custody. At the same time, we do consider the absence of these protections as one factor in the totality of circumstances in evaluating whether Abu Ali made his statements voluntarily…

In addition, the district court rejected Abu Ali’s testimony that the Saudis subjected him to coercive conditions of confinement. Instead, the court found believable the testimony of Saudi officers that they confined Abu Ali under reasonable conditions, including provision of three meals a day, and a cell with a bed, blanket and pillow. The court further found believable Saudi testimony that Saudi authorities did not question Abu Ali during his initial detention in Medina, and noted that Abu Ali’s own description of the Riyadh interrogation suggested that he was not questioned in Medina…

After consideration of all of the evidence and the extensive factual findings made by the district court, we conclude that Abu Ali’s statements were voluntary. Abu Ali was intelligent, articulate, and comfortable with the language and culture of the country in which he was detained and questioned. The district court found, based upon copious record evidence, that he was not tortured, abused, threatened, held in cruel conditions, or subjected to coercive interrogations. On the basis of the totality of these circumstances, we conclude that Abu Ali’s statements were “the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice.” Culombe, 367 U.S. at 602.

In summation, both the initial trial court and the Federal appeals court chose to believe the stories of the corrupt Saudi high police officialdom, and suppressed any evidence to the contrary. The professional observations and conclusions of medical and psychiatric personnel were ignored while “‘Abu Ali’s “claim about having been whipped’ during the early period of his detention” is rendered “implausible” because unidentified Saudi and American “witnesses” to the early period of his incarceration thought his behavior inconsistent “‘with how a recently beaten person would behave.’” This is truly remarkable. Who were these Saudi and American witnesses? I thought that no American saw Abu Ali in the early days of his arrest. Beyond that, by what criteria were these “witnesses” able to judge how a beaten individual should act? We aren’t told, nor are we expected to ask.

Rubber Stamp Court for Bush’s Reign of Terror

The Fourth Circuit’s decision in the Abu Ali case is a travesty of justice. It positions acceptance of coerced confessions as one of the centerpieces of Bush’s planned prosecutions of “terror” suspects in his star chamber military tribunals. For a moment last summer, it looked as if even the arch-conservative Fourth Circuit wouldn’t countenance Bush’s imperial presidential dragnet. Writing in a decision regarding another U.S. citizen marked as an “enemy combatant,” Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri, the same court wrote:

The government cannot subject al-Marri to indefinite military detention. For in the United States, the military cannot seize and imprison civilians – let alone imprison them indefinitely.

But that was a year ago, and politics never does stand still. The judges reconsidering the Abu Ali case found no problem in ignoring a defendant’s Miranda rights (which was another aspect of Abu Ali’s appeal), or choosing to believe foreign torturers over examination of medical personnel, or even the studied opinions of the United States’ own State Department. (The appeals court’s refusal to consider the lack of Miranda and other legal rights as bearing upon the voluntariness of a confession is a further outrage that deserves its own full discussion.)

These judges also ignored obvious precedent. They never referred to United States v. Hall (1996), wherein the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a kidnapping conviction when expert testimony relating to police interviews of the defendant were excluded.

The court noted that:

[O]nce the trial judge decided that Hall’s confession was voluntary, the jury was entitled “to hear the relevant evidence on the issue of voluntariness and [the trial judge was to] instruct the jury to give such weight to the confession as the jury feels it deserves under all the circumstances” (p.1344).

Yet, the judge in the Abu Ali trial disallowed psychiatric reports and government documentation of Saudi torture, and the high judges of the Fourth Circuit upheld this suppression of evidence. the Bush Administration and its military and CIA backers were handed a judicial victory in their war against the Constitution and equal justice under the law. As one of Abu Ali’s own attorneys, Elaine Cassell, summarized the situation after the initial trial judgment, the Abu Ali case means:

The U.S. can work with a foreign government to arrest and imprison a U.S. citizen and torture him. It can allow the imprisonment to go on indefinitely…

Then, if the U.S. (or allied country) citizen confesses under torture – and virtually everyone does, even if the confession is a lie – the U.S. may try to use the confession against him in a U.S. court, as well in a foreign court.

The Abu Ali decision represents an ominous development in the government’s attack on civil liberties, and a blow against those who struggle to end the hideous governmental practice of torture. I fear the decision will be felt from the kangaroo courts of Guantanamo to the asylum hearings of the INS, where applicants from countries across the globe – many of them tortured by allied U.S. governments such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, Uzbekistan, and others – seek safety and legal residency, often utilizing psychological evaluations as their only evidence of the torture they endured abroad.

Meanwhile, the decision has barely made a stir in the mainstream press or the so-called blogosphere, where the agony and ecstasy of discussing electoral politics mask the reality of state policies and oppressive actions that day in and day out act as a heavy yoke upon the shoulders of a desperate humanity.

“Oil is being drilled right now 60 miles off the coast of Florida,” the vice president said. “We’re not doing it, the Chinese are, in cooperation with the Cuban government. Even the communists have figured out that a good answer to high prices is more supply.”

He cited his source as columnist George Will, who last week wrote: “Drilling is under way 60 miles off Florida. The drilling is being done by China, in cooperation with Cuba, which is drilling closer to South Florida than U.S. companies are.”

Congressional Democrats pounced on the vice president’s remarks and were backed up by independent energy experts, who called the assertion hyperbole at best and a falsehood at worst.

Cheney’s office said in a statement to The Associated Press that the vice president had erred.

“It is our understanding that, although Cuba has leased out exploration blocks 60 miles off the coast of southern Florida, which is closer than American firms are allowed to operate in that area, no Chinese firm is drilling there,” according to the statement.

Cuba clearly is interested in developing its deep-water oil resources, estimated at more than 5 billion barrel, including areas within 60 miles of Key West, Fla., energy experts said.

Jorge Pinon, a senior energy fellow at the University of Miami specializing in Latin America, said Cuba has awarded offshore oil leases, or concessionary blocs, in its offshore waters to six oil companies – none of them Chinese – and soon may announce an agreement with Brazil’s state oil company, Petrobras.

“But no one is currently drilling in any of those concessions,” said Pinon in a telephone interview. Pinon, who supports drilling in the eastern Gulf and believes it can be done without hurting the environment, said China is being raised as an unnecessary “boogeyman” by drilling proponents.

“There is no actual drilling yet. …There is exploration,” said Johanna Mendelson-Forman, a senior fellow on energy and Latin America at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

She said China’s oil company, Sinopac, has conducted exploratory drilling on a lease on land in western Cuba, but is not involved in the offshore development.

But talk of China drilling in waters within 50 miles to 60 miles of Key West has been a common theme among Republicans. They are clamoring to open more of the country’s offshore waters to energy development, including the eastern Gulf where drilling is strongly opposed by Florida officials.

“China, thanks to a lease issued by Cuba, is drilling for oil just 50 miles from Florida’s coast,” Rep. George Radanovich, R-Calif., recently wrote in The Modesto Bee in California, arguing for opening waters that have been off limits for 25 years to U.S. companies.

Radanovich’s office said the congressman was in transit and not immediately available Thursday.

House Republican leader John Boehner of Ohio, calling for more domestic oil production, declared, “right at this moment some 60 miles or less off the coast of Key West, Fla., China has the green light to drill for oil.”

“Even China recognizes that oil and natural gas is readily available off our shores, thanks to Fidel Castro,” complained Rep. Roy Blunt of Missouri, a leader of a GOP energy task force.

Rep. Edward Markey, D-Mass., accused the Republicans of pushing oil development by “scaring up the ghosts of communism and xenophobia” and “perpetuating a myth that China is drilling off the coast of Florida.”

Blackwater’s Iraq contract was extended in April, but the company is by no means betting the house on its long-term presence there. While the firm is quietly maintaining its Iraq work, it is aggressively pursuing other business opportunities.In September it was revealed that Blackwater had been “tapped” by the Pentagon’s Counter Narcoterrorism Technology Program Office to compete for a share of a five-year, $15 billion budget “to fight terrorists with drug-trade ties.” According to the Army Times, the contract “could include anti-drug technologies and equipment, special vehicles and aircraft, communications, security training, pilot training, geographic information systems and in-field support.” A spokesperson for another company bidding for the work said that “80 percent of the work will be overseas.” As Richard Douglas, a deputy assistant secretary of defense, explained, “The fact is, we use Blackwater to do a lot of our training of counternarcotics police in Afghanistan. I have to say that Blackwater has done a very good job.”

Such an arrangement could find Blackwater operating in an arena with the godfathers of the war industry, such as Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman and Raytheon. It could also see Blackwater expanding into Latin America, joining other private security companies well established in the region. The massive US security company DynCorp is already deployed in Colombia, Bolivia and other countries as part of the “war on drugs.” In Colombia alone, US military contractors are receiving nearly half the $630 million in annual US military aid for the country. Just south of the US border, the United States has launched Plan Mexico, a $1.5 billion counternarcotics program. This and similar plans could provide lucrative business opportunities for Blackwater and other companies. “Blackwater USA’s enlistment in the drug war,” observed journalist John Ross, would be “a direct challenge to its stiffest competitor, DynCorp – up until now, the Dallas-based corporation has locked up 94 percent of all private drug war security contracts.” The New York Times reported that the contract could be Blackwater’s “biggest job ever.”

As populist movements grow stronger in Latin America, threatening US financial interests as well as the standing of right-wing US political allies in the region, the “war on drugs” is becoming an increasingly central part of US counterinsurgency efforts. It allows for more training of foreign security forces through the private sector – away from Congressional oversight – and a deployment of personnel from US war corporations. With US forces stretched thin, sending private security companies to Latin America offers Washington a “small footprint” alternative to the politically and militarily problematic deployment of active-duty US troops. In a January report by the United Nations working group on mercenaries, international investigators found that “an emerging trend in Latin America but also in other regions of the world indicates situations of private security companies protecting transnational extractive corporations whose employees are often involved in suppressing the legitimate social protest of communities and human rights and environmental organizations of the areas where these corporations operate.”

If there is one quality that is evident from examining Blackwater’s business history, it is the company’s ability to take advantage of emerging war and conflict markets. Throughout the decade of Blackwater’s existence, its creator, Erik Prince, has aggressively built his empire into a structure paralleling the US national security apparatus. “Prince wants to vault Blackwater into the major leagues of U.S. military contracting, taking advantage of the movement to privatize all kinds of government security,” reported the Wall Street Journal shortly after Nisour Square. “The company wants to be a one-stop shop for the U.S. government on missions to which it won’t commit American forces. This is a niche with few established competitors.”

In addition to providing armed forces for war and conflict zones and a wide range of military and police training services, Blackwater does a robust, multimillion-dollar business through its aviation division. It also has a growing maritime division and other national and international initiatives. Among these, Blackwater is in Japan, where its forces protect the US ballistic missile defense system, which, according to Stars and Stripes, “points high-powered radio waves westward toward mainland Asia to hunt for enemy missiles headed east toward America or its allies.” Meanwhile, early this year, Defense News reported, “Blackwater is training members of the Taiwanese National Security Bureau’s (NSB’s) special protection service, which guards the president. The NSB is responsible for the overall security of the country and was once an instrument of terrorism during the martial law period. Today, according to its Web site, the NSB is responsible for ‘national intelligence work, special protective service and unified cryptography.’” Former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto reportedly tried to hire Blackwater to protect her as she campaigned for the presidency in 2007. Conflicting reports indicated that either the US State Department or the Pakistani government vetoed the plan. She was assassinated in December.

What could prove to be one of Blackwater’s most profitable and enduring enterprises is one of the company’s most secretive initiatives – a move into the world of privatized intelligence services. In April 2006, Prince quietly began building Total Intelligence Solutions, which boasts that it “brings CIA-style” services to the open market for Fortune 500 companies. Among its offerings are “surveillance and counter-surveillance, deployed intelligence collection, and rapid safeguarding of employees or other key assets.”

As the United States finds itself in the midst of the most radical privatization agenda in its history, few areas have seen as dramatic a transformation to privatized services as the world of intelligence. “This is the magnet now. Everything is being attracted to these private companies in terms of individuals and expertise and functions that were normally done by the intelligence community,” says former CIA division chief and senior analyst Melvin Goodman. “My major concern is the lack of accountability, the lack of responsibility. The entire industry is essentially out of control. It’s outrageous.”

Last year R.J. Hillhouse, a blogger who investigates the clandestine world of private contractors and US intelligence, obtained documents from the office of the Directorate of National Intelligence (DNI) showing that Washington spends some $42 billion annually on private intelligence contractors, up from $17.5 billion in 2000. That means 70 percent of the US intelligence budget is going to private companies. Perhaps it is no surprise, then, that the head of DNI is Mike McConnell, the former chair of the board of the Intelligence and National Security Alliance, the private intelligence industry’s trade association.

Total Intelligence, which opened for business in February 2007, is a fusion of three entities bought up by Prince: the Terrorism Research Center, Technical Defense and The Black Group – Blackwater vice chair Cofer Black’s consulting agency. The company’s leadership reads like a Who’s Who of the CIA’s “war on terror” operations after 9/11. In addition to the twenty-eight-year CIA veteran Black, who is chair of Total Intelligence, the company’s executives include CEO Robert Richer, the former associate deputy director of the agency’s Directorate of Operations and the second-ranking official in charge of clandestine operations. From 1999 to 2004, Richer was head of the CIA’s Near East and South Asia Division, where he ran clandestine operations throughout the Middle East and South Asia. As part of his duties, he was the CIA liaison with Jordan’s King Abdullah, a key US ally and Blackwater client, and briefed George W. Bush on the burgeoning Iraqi resistance in its early stages.

Total Intelligence’s chief operating officer is Enrique “Ric” Prado, a twenty-four-year CIA veteran and former senior executive officer in the Directorate of Operations. He spent more than a decade working in the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center and ten years with the CIA’s “paramilitary” Special Operations Group. Prado and Black worked closely at the CIA. Prado also served in Latin America with Jose Rodriguez, who gained infamy late last year after it was revealed that as director of the National Clandestine Service at the CIA he was allegedly responsible for destroying videotapes of interrogations of prisoners, during which “enhanced interrogation techniques,” including waterboarding, were reportedly used. Richer told the New York Times he recalled many conversations with Rodriguez, about the tapes. “He would always say, ‘I’m not going to let my people get nailed for something they were ordered to do,’” Richer said of his former boss. Before the scandal, there were reports that Blackwater had been “aggressively recruiting” Rodriguez. He has since retired from the CIA.

The leadership of Total Intelligence also includes Craig Johnson, a twenty-seven-year CIA officer who specialized in Central and South America, and Caleb “Cal” Temple, who joined the company straight out of the Defense Intelligence Agency, where he served from 2004 to ’06 as chief of the Office of Intelligence Operations in the Joint Intelligence Task Force – Combating Terrorism. According to his Total Intelligence bio, Temple directed the “DIA’s 24/7 analytic terrorism target development and other counterterrorism intelligence activities in support of military operations worldwide. He also oversaw 24/7 global counterterrorism indications and warning analysis for the U.S. Defense Department.” The company also boasts officials drawn from the Drug Enforcement Agency and the FBI.

Total Intelligence is run out of an office on the ninth floor of a building in the Ballston area of Arlington, Virginia. Its “Global Fusion Center,” complete with large-screen TVs broadcasting international news channels and computer stations staffed by analysts surfing the web, “operates around the clock every day of the year” and is modeled after the CIA’s counterterrorist center, once run by Black. The firm employs at least sixty-five full-time staff – some estimates say it’s closer to 100. “Total Intel brings the… skills traditionally honed by CIA operatives directly to the board room,” Black said when the company launched. “With a service like this, CEOs and their security personnel will be able to respond to threats quickly and confidently – whether it’s determining which city is safest to open a new plant in or working to keep employees out of harm’s way after a terrorist attack.”

Black insists, “This is a completely legal enterprise. We break no laws. We don’t go anywhere near breaking laws. We don’t have to.” But what services Total Intelligence is providing, and to whom, is shrouded in secrecy. It is clear, though, that the company is leveraging the reputations and inside connections of its executives. “Cofer can open doors,” Richer told the Washington Post in 2007. “I can open doors. We can generally get in to see who we need to see. We don’t help pay bribes. We do everything within the law, but we can deal with the right minister or person.” Black told the paper he and Richer spend a lot of their time traveling. “I am discreet in where I go and who I see. I spend most of my time dealing with senior people in governments, making connections.” But it is clear that the existing connections from the former spooks’ time at the agency have brought business to Total Intelligence.

Take the case of Jordan. For years, Richer worked closely with King Abdullah, as his CIA liaison. As journalist Ken Silverstein reported, “The CIA has lavishly subsidized Jordan’s intelligence service, and has sent millions of dollars in recent years for intelligence training. After Richer retired, sources say, he helped Blackwater land a lucrative deal with the Jordanian government to provide the same sort of training offered by the CIA. Millions of dollars that the CIA ‘invested’ in Jordan walked out the door with Richer – if this were a movie, it would be a cross between Jerry Maguire and Syriana. ‘People [at the agency] are pissed off,’ said one source. ‘Abdullah still speaks with Richer regularly, and he thinks that’s the same thing as talking to us. He thinks Richer is still the man.’ Except in this case it’s Richer, not his client, yelling ‘show me the money.’”

In a 2007 interview on the cable business network CNBC, Black was brought on as an analyst to discuss “investing in Jordan.” At no point in the interview was Black identified as working for the Jordanian government. Total Intelligence was described as “a corporate consulting firm that includes investment strategy,” while “Ambassador Black” was introduced as “a twenty-eight-year veteran of the CIA,” the “top counterterror guy” and “a key planner for the breathtakingly rapid victory of American forces that toppled the Taliban in Afghanistan.” Black heaped lavish praise on Jordan and its monarchy. “You have leadership, King Abdullah, His Majesty King Abdullah, who is certainly kind towards investors, very protective,” Black said. “Jordan is, in our view, a very good investment. There are some exceptional values there.” He said Jordan is in a region where there are “numerous commodities that are being produced and doing well.”

With no hint of the brutality behind the exodus, Black argued that the flood of Iraqi refugees fleeing the violence of the US occupation was good for potential investors in Jordan. “We get something like 600, 700,000 Iraqis that have moved from Iraq into Jordan that require cement, furniture, housing and the like. So it is a – it is an island of growth and potential, certainly in that immediate area. So it looks good,” he said. “There are opportunities for investment. It is not all bad. Sometimes Americans need to watch a little less TV… But there is – there is opportunity in everything. That’s why you need situation awareness, and that’s one of the things that our company does. It provides the kinds of intelligence and insight to provide situational awareness so you can make the best investments.”

Black and other Total Intelligence executives have turned their CIA careers, reputations, contacts and connections into business opportunities. What they once did for the US government, they now do for private interests. It is not difficult to imagine clients feeling as though they are essentially hiring the US government to serve their own interests. In 2007 Richer told the Post that now that he is in the private sector, foreign military officials and others are more willing to give him information than they were when he was with the CIA. Richer recalled a conversation with a foreign general during which he was surprised at the potentially “classified” information the general revealed. When Richer asked why the general was giving him the information, he said the general responded, “If I tell it to an embassy official I’ve created espionage. You’re a business partner.”

In May, Erik Prince gave a speech in front of his family and supporters in his home state of Michigan. Security was extremely tight, and Blackwater barred cameras and tape recorders from the event. “The idea that we are a secretive facility, and nefarious, is just ridiculous,” Prince told the friendly crowd of 750 gathered at the Amway Grand Plaza. In Iraq, Blackwater has banked on the idea that it is a sort of American Express card for the occupation. But for the future, Prince has a different corporate model, as he indicated in his speech. “When you send something overseas, do you use FedEx or the postal service?” he asked.

There are serious problems with this analogy. When you send something by FedEx, you can track your package and account for its whereabouts at all times. You can have your package insured against loss or damage. That has not been the case with Blackwater. The people who foot the sizable bill for its “services” almost never know, until it is too late, what Blackwater is doing, and there are apparently no consequences for Blackwater when things go lethally wrong. “We are essentially a robust temp agency,” Prince told his fans in Michigan. He’s right about that one. A temp agency serving the most radical privatization agenda in history.

I knew that I was more likely to be arrested and charged than Mr Bolton. I had no intention of harming him, or of acting in any way that could be interpreted as aggressive, but had I sought only to steer him gently towards the police I might have faced a range of exotic charges, from false imprisonment to aggravated assault. I was prepared to take this risk. It is not enough to demand that other people act, knowing that they will not. If the police, the courts and the state fail to prosecute what the Nuremberg tribunal described as “the supreme international crime”, I believe we have a duty to seek to advance the process.

The Nuremberg principles, which arose from the prosecution of Nazi war criminals, define as an international crime the “planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances”. Bolton appears to have “participated in a common plan” to prepare for the war (also defined by the principles as a crime) by inserting the false claim that Iraq was seeking to procure uranium from Niger into a state department factsheet. He also organised the sacking of José Bustani, the head of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, accusing him of bad management. Bustani had tried to broker a peaceful resolution of the dispute over Iraq’s alleged weapons of mass destruction.

Some of the most pungent criticisms of my feeble attempt to bring this man to justice have come from other writers for the Guardian. Michael White took a position of extraordinary generosity towards the instigators of the war. There are “arguments on both sides”, he contended on the Guardian politics blog. Bustani might have received compensation after his sacking by Bolton, “but Bolton says that does not mean much”. In fact, Bustani was not only compensated at his tribunal, he was completely exonerated of Bolton’s accusations and his employers were obliged to pay special damages.

White suggested that Iraq might indeed have been seeking uranium from Niger, on the grounds of a conversation he once had with an MI6 officer. Alongside the British government’s 45-minute claim, this must be the best-documented of all the false justifications for the war with Iraq. In 2002, the United States government sent three senior officials to Niger to investigate the claim. All reported that it was without foundation. The International Atomic Energy Agency discovered that it was based on crude forgeries. This assessment was confirmed by the state department’s official Greg Thielmann, who reported directly to John Bolton. No evidence beyond the forged documents has been provided by either the US or the UK governments to support their allegation.

White also gives credence to Bolton’s claims that the war in 2003 was justified by two UN resolutions – 678 and 687 – which were approved in 1990 and 1991, and that it was permitted by article 51 of the UN charter. The attempt to revive resolutions 678 and 687 was the last, desperate throw of the dice by the Blair government when all else had failed. When it became clear that it could not obtain a new UN resolution authorizing force against Iraq, the government dusted down the old ones, which had been drafted in response to Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait.

This revival formed the basis of Lord Goldsmith’s published advice on March 17 2003. It was described as “risible” and “scrap[ing] the bottom of the legal barrel” by Lord Alexander, a senior law lord. After the first Gulf war, Colin Powell, General Sir Peter de la Billiere and John Major all stated that the UN’s resolutions permitted them only to expel the Iraqi army from Kuwait, and not to overthrow the Iraqi government. Lord Goldsmith himself, in the summer of 2002, advised Tony Blair that resolutions 678 and 687 could not be used to justify a new war with Iraq.

Article 51 of the UN charter is comprehensible to anyone but the lawyers employed by the Bush administration. States have a right to self-defence “if an armed attack occurs against” them, and then only until the UN security council can intervene. On what occasion did Iraq attack the United States? Is there any claim made by the Blair and Bush governments that Michael White is not prepared to believe?

Conor Foley, writing on Comment is free, suggested that my action “completely trivializes the serious case” against the Iraq war and claimed that I was seeking to “imprison… people because of their political opinions”, as if Bolton were simply a commentator on the war, and not an agent. Does he really believe that the former under-secretary did not “participate in a common plan” to initiate the war with Iraq? What other conceivable purpose might the state department’s misleading factsheet have served? And what more serious action can someone who is neither a law lord nor a legislator take? Bolton himself maintains that my attempt to bring him to justice reflects a “move towards lawlessness and fascism”. This is an interesting commentary on an attempt to uphold a law which arose from the prosecution of fascists.

But there is one charge I do accept: that my chances of success were very slight. Apart from the 300-pound gorillas, the main obstacle I faced was that although the crime of aggression, as defined by the Nuremberg principles, has been incorporated into the legislation of many countries, it has not been assimilated into the laws of England and Wales. This does not lessen the crime but it means that it cannot yet be tried here. This merely highlights another injustice: while the British state is prepared to punish petty misdemeanors with vindictive ferocity, it will not legislate against the greatest crime of all, lest it expose itself to prosecution.

But demonstration has two meanings. Non-violent direct action is both a protest and an exposition. It seeks to demonstrate truths which have been overlooked or forgotten. I sought to remind people that the greatest crime of the 21st century remains unprosecuted, and remains a great crime. If you have read this far, I have succeeded.

Some senior Iraqi political leaders said they had serious concerns over the central issues under negotiation, including what sort of military operations and arrests of Iraqis the American troops could carry out without Iraq’s permission, legal immunities sought for American troops and security contractors and what the Iraqi officials characterized as demands for a long-term American military presence.The Iraqi leaders also say they have reservations about rushing the talks, partly because they believe it makes little sense to negotiate with a lame-duck American president. Their concerns raise questions about whether a new security pact can be negotiated by the end of July, as American officials have suggested. The United Nations resolution governing the presence of United States troops expires at the end of the year.

“This agreement is between Iraq and the United States president, and the American policy is not clear,” said Ali Adeeb, a senior member of the Shiite Dawa Party and a close ally of Mr. Maliki’s. “We can wait until the American elections to deal with a Democratic or Republican president.”

A United States official familiar with the talks described as “completely false” the assertion that negotiators had sought any provisions for long-term American military garrisons in Iraq.

Nor have Iraqi negotiators signaled any desire to delay, the official said. “What we are hearing is that they want to move full steam ahead.”

The raw feelings that the negotiations engender among many Iraqis – who view the prospects of a long-term American troop presence as demeaning and humiliating – underscore the political risks the negotiations hold for Mr. Maliki’s government.

Tens of thousands of Shiites in Baghdad and southern Iraq who are loyal to the cleric Moktada al-Sadr denounced the negotiations in rallies after noon prayers on Friday, criticizing any pact that would allow American troops to establish a long-term presence in Iraq. “No America! No Israel!” demonstrators shouted in Sadr City, the Baghdad district that is Mr. Sadr’s base of power.

“This isn’t an Iraqi government, it’s an American government,” said Muhammad Mohsin, a 25-year-old laborer who attended prayers in Sadr City, where clerics delivered sermons condemning the negotiations and demonstrators later burned American flags. “The Americans keep pressuring Maliki to carry out what they want. The agreement will only serve the Americans’ interests.”

Mr. Sadr, who appears to be using the controversy to build his support after the Iraqi military occupied Sadrist strongholds in Baghdad and Basra, has demanded that whatever agreement emerges from negotiations be put to a national referendum.

But there are many Iraqi politicians who support the negotiations, including Sunni leaders who view an American military presence as a bulwark against what they fear could be an attempt by Shiite leaders backed by Iran to renew a sectarian grab for Baghdad and the mixed areas around the capital.

“We think that this agreement will guarantee the rights of Iraq and the United States,” said Adnan al-Dulaimi, a leader of Tawafiq, the largest Sunni political bloc. “If the American forces withdraw from Iraq before the right time, a state of chaos and civil war will ensue.”

But opposition to the security pact is not confined just to the Sadrists. Officials from the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, an important Maliki ally, said several parts of the proposal violated Iraq’s sovereignty.

Other lawmakers said negotiations should not resume until after the expiration of the United Nations resolution on United States troops. Otherwise, they said, Iraq would be in too weak a position to negotiate effectively.

“The negotiations now are not equal, and the results will be more for the benefit of America,” said Mahmoud Othman, an independent Kurdish lawmaker. “To have a long-term agreement with the Bush administration, which has five months to go, is wrong,” he added. “The Iraqi government should wait for the new American administration and then have an agreement with it.”

A second American official in Baghdad said that the Iraqis appeared to be unwilling to make any concessions before the provincial elections scheduled for later this year that would seem to voters to be too accommodating to the occupying forces. “They are playing hardball right now,” the official said.

American and Iraqi negotiators are far apart on a number of issues, said Mr. Adeeb and another senior lawmaker close to Mr. Maliki, Haider al-Abadi, in interviews on Friday.

The Americans want to continue to have “a free hand” to arrest Iraqis and carry out military operations, and they want authority for more than 50 long-term military bases, Mr. Adeeb said. He said that he doubted that a security pact along the lines sought by the Americans would pass in the Iraqi Parliament.

Mr. Abadi, another senior member of Dawa, said Americans were insisting on keeping control of Iraqi airspace and retaining legal immunity for American troops, contractors and private security guards.

The United States official familiar with the negotiations accused Iran of orchestrating a disinformation campaign to undermine the negotiations, saying, “This is Iran’s playbook.”

The official, who like others interviewed for this article requested anonymity because of the fluid nature of the negotiations, said the debate over what kinds of operations American troops could carry out without Iraqi permission “will be subject to constant revisions and review.” Troops right now are cooperating extensively with Iraqi security forces, and the “new mandate should reflect that fact,” the official said.

American service members in deployments similar to Iraq are subject only to American military law, the official said, adding that American officials wanted to retain control of Iraqi airspace because the Iraqi government did not have the ability to manage that area yet. “It’s a question of technical proficiency and capacity,” the official said.

The American ambassador to Iraq, Ryan C. Crocker, told Congress last month that “the agreement will not establish permanent bases in Iraq, and we anticipate that it will expressly forswear them.” He also said the agreement would not specify troop levels, or “tie the hands of the next administration.”